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Abstract
Over the last several years digital pests - namely viruses
and spam - have reached epidemic proportions, severely
impacting the usability of digital communication systems,
primarily affecting email. These pests result in increased
bandwidth usage, increased operating costs, potential se-
curity threats and above all decreased usability. They also
have the potential to create Denial of Service attacks, crip-
pling the networks that they infect or target. Whilst to date
they have been mostly confined to email, it is becoming ap-
parent that they have the potential to impact digital com-
munications infrastructure of the future. For example, con-
cerns have already been raised with regards to the potential
impact of spam on Voice over IP. Spam and viruses have
also been appearing within other technologies and commu-
nication media, including mobile phone networks and hand
held devices. To combat the abovementioned security prob-
lems, we propose an email scanning gateway using open
source tools, whilst ensuring that the gateway can be read-
ily deployed in a commercial environment. In this paper we
present details of the design and implementation, and dis-
cuss several possible applications of our proposed system.
1. Introduction
Digital communication systems have provided an ex-
treme level of connectivity, especially when compared to
their non-digital counterparts. In particular, email has pro-
vided a mechanism for people around the globe to commu-
nicate, effectively without cost. Unlike normal mail, email
is delivered with minimal delay and unlike the phone sys-
tem, it is not dependant on the recipient being currently
available. These key elements have resulted in email be-
coming one of the most widely used communication sys-
tems, being the backbone of many businesses. However,
the key aspects of digital communication systems, those that
have made it as successful and as usable as it is, have also
allowed for it to be heavily abused. Digital pests have used
the same aspects to their advantage, much to the detriment
of email users. Additionally, there is not a single entity that
controls the Internet, therefore people who abuse the system
cannot be easily located and disconnected, unlike a phone
network.
There are two main forms of digital pests, namely spam
and viruses, both of which occur in various digital com-
munication systems including email, mobile phones, hand
held devices, instant messaging and Voice over IP (VoIP).
The requirements for the successful transmission and repli-
cation of viruses and worms is discussed in section 2. Spam
is detailed in section 3, including the motivation for spam-
mers, the primary properties of digital communication sys-
tems that allow spam to work and the impact it has on digital
communications. A summary of currently known technolo-
gies for combating viruses and spam is presented in section
4. The design and implementation of an email scanning
gateway that uses open source tools to deploy a select num-
ber of these technologies, is proposed in section 5. Appli-
cation of this implementation to various digital communi-
cation networks is discussed in section 6. Finally, possible
further research is discussed and a conclusion is presented1.
2. Viruses and Worms
Viruses and worms require a method of invoking them-
selves on the device they are attempting to infect, typically
exploiting a security hole that exists due to poor program-
ming or tricking the user into invoking it. A form of trans-
mission is also required in order for the virus or worm to
infect new systems. Transmission methods available in-
1Due to space constraints, some content has been omitted. For a full
copy of this paper please contact the authors via email.
clude floppy disks, bluetooth, email and digital networks
such as the Internet. Viruses and worms currently infect
computer systems, particularly those running a Microsoft
Windows operating system, mobile phones and hand held
devices such as PDAs. In the not too distant future we may
see VoIP equipment being infected if security holes within
phone firmware are found and exploited - an example of
previously found security issues is detailed in [2].
The last few years have seen a huge increase in the num-
ber of viruses and worms that transfer themselves via email,
either exploiting a security hole in the end user’s mail client
or tricking the user into opening and executing an attach-
ment. The Melissa virus which appeared during 1999 is
arguably one of the first viruses to transmit itself via email,
with many since following suit. Email is a simple and ef-
fective means of transferring data between systems, in this
case the data being the viral executable.
3. The Spam Problem
Over the last couple of years Unsolicited Commercial
Email (UCE), more commonly known as spam, has be-
come a major problem with email communication. Sim-
ply put, spam is email that you receive without ever having
requested it, typically being of a commercial or advertis-
ing nature. Whilst to date it has been primarily limited to
email, a number of people have raised concerns with re-
gards to other forms of digital communication infrastruc-
ture, including Voice over IP (VoIP) [9], Instant Messaging
(IM) [11] and the Short Message Service (SMS) [10] pro-
vided by many mobile phone networks.
The main problem with spam stems from people wanting
to allow unknown and unauthorised people to contact them
for legitimate purposes, meaning that anyone, anywhere,
can contact and communicate with them. Whilst existing
communications infrastructure such as the standard phone
system and postal system could be used to send spam, two
issues exist for the sender. Firstly, it is prohibitively expen-
sive. In Australia it will cost around $0.25AUD to make
a local phone call and $0.50AUD to send a standard let-
ter. Generating either in massive proportions, as required
for spam to be successful, would cost the originator a large
sum of money. Secondly, neither of these forms of commu-
nications can be completely automated - a large amount of
time has to be spent to generate and post the letters or make
the phone calls.
Digital communication systems have a number of prop-
erties that are the opposites of their non-digital counter-
parts. Firstly, communication is cheap, with email and
VoIP phone calls effectively being free of charge. Secondly,
these services are semi-anonymous, allowing for messages
to be generated that are hard to block and difficult to track.
Thirdly, they can be easily automated, allowing for minimal
human interaction.
Spam has a huge potential to destroy these precious dig-
ital communication mechanisms, as it severely reduces us-
ability and causes numerous problems for the end user, in-
cluding wasted time and effort in deleting unwanted mes-
sages. Additionally, for users who incur per megabyte data
charges, the cost of receiving massive quantities of un-
wanted email adds up. The bandwidth usage is also of con-
cern for users of mobile and ad-hoc networks, where band-
width is in very short supply and/or extremely expensive.
Mobile users connecting to the Internet via a digital mobile
network, such as GPRS or CDMA 1X are examples of this.
4. Existing Technologies
A number of solutions exist to reduce the amount of
spam received by email users. This section briefly covers
a number of these technologies and identifies their associ-
ated strengths and weaknesses.
4.1. Filtering/Tagging
A large number of spam filters exist, most of which
implement some form of pattern or word matching in an
attempt to distinguish spam from non-spam (commonly
known as ham). Many of the more successful spam filters
implement Bayesian classification engines [5, 6, 13], calcu-
lating a weighting based on each word that appears within
the email message. Once a message is identified as being
spam a number of different approaches can be used. These
include tagging the message, either by appending new head-
ers to the RFC2822 [12] email message or by changing the
subject line; storing the message in a separate account or
folder, for later retrieval and deletion; or deleting the mes-
sage.
Whilst such filtering can prove extremely useful, assist-
ing the user in the task of separating the spam from the ham,
either at the mail server or on the end user’s system, a num-
ber of issues exist. There is still a potential for false nega-
tives and worse, false positives. If the user is simply filtering
messages off to one side and checking through them man-
ually, the issues associated with this are greatly reduced.
However, if messages are automatically deleted when they
are considered to be spam, a single false positive will result
in legitimate email being deleted, without any notification
to the user.
4.2. Blocklists
Due to the fact that a large amount of spam originates
from a small number of professional spammers, blocklists
based on the sender IP address and envelope from address
can be effective, if well maintained.
4.2.1. IP Based Blocklists
When a remote system connects to an SMTP server the
SMTP session may be accepted or rejected, based on the
remote system’s IP address. For spammers that own a net-
work block or have been allocated static addresses by their
upstream ISP, IP based blocklists can be used effectively, re-
jecting email that originates from these systems. Spammers
can however work around this by delivering email through
other mail relays, particularly those running on systems that
have been compromised. Regularly changing mail relays
will bypass this mechanism, making it very difficult to im-
plement effective IP based blocking. This has become even
more of an issue of late, with spammers using viruses such
as Sobig to deliver an SMTP engine to a large number of
“zombie” systems.
4.2.2. Domain Blocklists
Like IP based blocklists, domain based blocklists can be
used to reject email which appears to originate from a par-
ticular domain. Whilst this does not appear to be as effective
as IP based blocklists, it can still be useful against spammers
using throwaway domains and/or small companies who do
their own mass-marketing via email. Most Mail Transport
Agents (MTAs) allow the system administrator to specify
a list of email addresses and domains from which email
should be rejected, typically returning a hard SMTP error
code in response to the MAIL command, if the envelope
from address matches a domain or address on the blacklist.
4.3. Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) aims to prevent the
spoofing of email by stipulating which IP addresses email
can originate from for a given domain. Within the DNS
records for a domain an additional TXT resource record is
added, specifying IP addresses of allowed senders. Email
which appears to be from this domain and originates from
other IP addresses will be considered suspect and may not
be delivered, depending on the MTA configuration.
A number of problems currently exist with SPF. Firstly,
spammers can quite easily register throwaway domains and
configure SPF records for each domain, specifying their
own IP address blocks as legitimate senders. This allows for
such a mechanism to be easily bypassed. Secondly, whilst
in many circumstances it will be easy for a company to have
fixed IP addresses where email can originate from for their
domain, in other cases it can be extremely difficult. Con-
sider a member of staff working from home, connected via
their ISP. Email sent from this machine will not be consid-
ered legitimate unless the IP address belonging to the ISP
is added to the SPF record. Alternatively, the user would
need to relay email via the corporate mail server. Thirdly,
at least one implementation of SPF is patent encumbered,
namely Sender-ID, severely impacting the potential imple-
mentation and use of this protocol.
4.4. DomainKeys
DomainKeys [3] aims to provide sender authentication,
preventing the spoofing of email. Like SPF it uses DNS
TXT resource records to provide authentication data, how-
ever public key cryptography is used as opposed to the IP
addresses of legitimate senders; the process being similar to
the ideas presented in [8]. To use DomainKeys the owner
of the domain generates a key pair and publishes the pub-
lic key via DNS. When sending an email the message is
canonicalised and the private key is used to sign the mes-
sage, with the signature being added as a new RFC2822
message header. When a system receives this message the
signature can be verified by retrieving the public key from
DNS and checking that the signature is authentic.
Whilst DomainKeys will allow recipients to verify that
the sender is allowed to send email for the given domain,
spammers will be also able to publish public keys for throw-
away domains that they have registered. This means that
DomainKeys, like SPF, will only be useful for preventing
spammers from spoofing email to make it look like it origi-
nated from domains they do not control. Additionally, Do-
mainKeys currently lacks any form of granularity, mean-
ing that there is only one private key per domain. This
requires that all email be signed at the corporate gateway,
otherwise a copy of the private key would need to exist on
each workstation, severely impacting the security of the de-
ployment. This problem is only extended with road warrior
users whereby the private key may be leaked to a third party
if a laptop is misplaced. The canonicalised form of the mes-
sage that was originally signed is also a potential source of
problems, particularly for messages that have been modified
by intermediate MTAs. Unless the exact message canon-
icalisation can be achieved, the signature will not verify -
even if the message is legitimate and signed correctly.
4.5. Greylisting
Greylisting [7] is a technology that ensures an SMTP
server behaves in a manner that complies with RFC2821
before accepting email from it. When a connection is re-
ceived from an unknown SMTP server, a greylisting imple-
mentation will return a soft SMTP error code and record the
tuple consisting of the envelope from address, envelope to
address and remote IP address. Providing that the delivery
of this message is reattempted with the same tuple after a
given period of time (typically 30 minutes), the remote IP
address will be added to a whitelist of known SMTP servers.
Once whitelisted, an SMTP server can successfully deliver
mail without delay.
Many spammers use custom mass-mailing applications
that will either give up if a soft SMTP error code is received
or retry repeatedly for a short period of time. Additionally,
the envelope to and from addresses are often changed at ran-
dom, as is the mail relay in use. As a result, most spammers
will never end up on the whitelist and their mail will never
be accepted.
5. Implementation
An email scanning gateway was built for use in a com-
mercial network, using only freely available open source
tools. This section details the design and implementation of
this system, before discussing the results achieved from its
deployment.
5.1. Design
The design goals of the system are to prevent the deliv-
ery of email borne viruses and to reduce the amount of spam
received by users. Primarily three of the previously men-
tioned technologies were deployed, along with a number of
other systems to increase the overall effectiveness (see fig-
ure 1). The Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) used was Qmail,
a modular, robust, secure and flexible system that is easily
modified to alter its behaviour. Qmail-Scanner, a Perl based
content analyser, ensures that a message is compliant with
RFC2822, before scanning the message for viruses using
Clam Anti-virus, an open source anti-virus toolkit. If the
message is found to be a virus, Qmail-Scanner will quaran-
tine the message and notify the postmaster. If the message
does not contain a virus SpamAssassin is used to determine
the likelihood of the message being spam. Finally, Qmail-
Scanner adds two additional RFC2822 headers to the mes-
sage, detailing the rankings returned from SpamAssassin.
These headers can be used for filtering within the Mail User
Agent (MUA).
At the firewall, spamd, a spam deferral daemon included
with the OpenBSD operating system, is used to provide
SMTP greylisting (see figure 2). The Spamhaus SBL is
also used in conjunction with spamd. SMTP connections
from all blacklisted IP addresses are tarpitted, wasting the
spammer’s time and resources. Additionally, local IP and
domain blacklists are maintained, rejecting the receipt of
email from various unwanted sources. It is also worth not-
ing that the entire system was designed and implemented in
a manner that allows for easy replication.
5.2. Results
The results observed after deploying the above men-
tioned system are far from scientific. However, anecdotal
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evidence suggests that the use of an IP based block list, such
as the Spamhaus SBL, can be highly effective when com-
bined with SMTP greylisting. A number of users were re-
ceiving in excess of 100 spam messages per day prior to the
deployment of the filtering system. After the introduction
of the email scanning gateway, without greylisting support,
the same users were only receiving between 5-10 spam per
day. Greylisting was implemented approximately a month
later and resulted in the the same users receiving 1 or 2 spam
per day, a significant decrease from the 100+ per day previ-
ously received. Additionally, in the first month of deploy-
ment around 2000 messages were quarantined due to con-
taining viral executables. During the following month, after
the addition of greylisting, only 447 viruses were quaran-
tined. This seems to be a pleasant side-effect of greylisting,
as it would appear that the internal SMTP engines used by
many viruses do not adhere to retry intervals, hence delivery
is not reattempted at a later point in time.
6. Applications
This section discusses the application of anti-virus and
anti-spam technologies, such as the ones used to implement
the previously detailed email scanning gateway, within var-
ious digital communication networks and infrastructure. In
all cases the aim is to prevent viruses and spam from be-
ing received by our systems, preferably also preventing the
transmission of digital pests to other network hosts.
6.1. Geostationary Satellite
If a geostationary satellite link is used as the last hop
to a corporate network that hosts a local mail server, there
may be benefits in deploying scanning and filtering sys-
tems on both sides of the link, effectively being located
on each of the terrestrial gateways. This would allow for
viruses and spam, both outbound and inbound, to be com-
bated prior to reaching the geostationary satellite link, re-
ducing the amount of traffic being routed via satellite. In
this configuration, SMTP traffic that is destined for the cor-
porate mail server would be scanned for viruses, blocked via
IP address blacklists and/or greylisted, prior to the SMTP
connection occurring over the satellite link. Likewise, out-
bound SMTP traffic would also be scanned prior to leaving
the network, preventing the transmission of unwanted traffic
over the link.
A number of gains may be experienced by deploying
an email scanning gateway prior to the geostationary satel-
lite link. Firstly, many carriers within Australia charge per
megabyte for data, thus preventing the transmission of un-
wanted email will result in a cost reduction for the user.
Secondly, the connections to the scanning gateway do not
have to cross over the satellite link, which typically exhibit
large Round Trip Times (RTT) and high Bit Error Rates
(BER). Once again, this will reduce the amount of traffic
on the satellite link, reducing costs and decreasing latency
for other traffic traversing the network.
6.2. Wireless Networks
With wireless networks, a single mobile user may change
between any number of base stations during the course of
using the network. Anti-spam and anti-virus technologies
could be deployed within wireless base stations, prevent-
ing unwanted email from leaving the network. A well con-
figured firewall, along with the proxying of protocols such
as HTTP [4] and SMTP, would allow for scanning of out-
bound email traffic. If SPF became ubiquitous, one option
would be to implement the appropriate checks within the
base station or local SMTP proxy. For example, when the
envelope from address is specified via the MAIL command
during the SMTP session, the SPF record can be retrieved
for the domain and if the sender’s IP address is not listed
as a valid originating IP address for the domain, the SMTP
session could be terminated with a hard error code. The
same technique could be applied with DomainKeys, how-
ever this would not be able to prevent spammers from trans-
mitting spam having a from address of a throwaway domain
for which an appropriate public key has been published via
DNS.
6.3. Voice over IP (VoIP)
Concerns have been raised with regards to the potential
for spam to impact the usability of VoIP. Like email, VoIP
increases the level of connectivity available by providing
voice based communication that is effectively free of cost.
Additionally, many VoIP systems provide voicemail. Due to
the low level of cost involved, it is possible for a spammer to
make hundreds or thousands of automated calls, delivering
a pre-recorded message to VoIP users or to their voicemail
service. In comparison, the standard phone system uses a
fixed identifier that is costly and awkward to change. Calls
are typically expensive and are difficult to automate.
Unlike email, VoIP is not a store and forward system, in-
stead it is a real-time process that allows for normal conver-
sation. As such, technologies such as greylisting become
useless, as do filtering and tagging systems. At this stage
caller identification appears to be the only weapon against
abuse of VoIP. For example, you could configure your VoIP
phone to only accept calls from specific people. This how-
ever, would largely defeat the purpose of this communica-
tion system, as people would not be able to contact you
without prior arrangement. An alternative system would
be one analogous to those used by many instant messaging
protocols, whereby when a new contact attempts to com-
municate with you, an option to accept or reject the contact
is provided. This however, will not prevent new spammers
from annoying you at 4am with an incoming pre-recorded
phone call. Callback or CAPTCHA [1, 14] based tech-
niques may provide a solution, requiring human interaction
to validate the VoIP call before the receiver’s phone actually
rings.
6.4. Mobile Networks
Many users of mobile phone networks receive SMS
based spam from time-to-time, something which appears to
be more of a problem in the United States where the recipi-
ent pays, as opposed to the sender pays model used in Aus-
tralia. It may be possible to identify and block SMS based
spam by deploying a filtering system within the mobile net-
work SMS infrastructure. Unlike email, SMS spam is typ-
ically delivered to the mobile network in the same man-
ner as standard SMS messages, making technologies like
greylisting impractical. However, content analysis could be
highly effective, particularly if coupled with a system for
users to report the receipt of SMS spam. This would allow
for the creation of a message blocklist, whereby after re-
ceiving multiple reports of a spam SMS, a hash algorithm
such as SHA1 could be used to identify identical messages
and terminate delivery. As with email, this may be avoided
by sending the same message with minor changes. Rate
limiting would be another technique that may be effective,
restricting the number of messages that can be sent from a
single user within a given period of time.
7. Further Research
Whilst many of the technologies detailed within this pa-
per are effective, it is becoming evident that the intelligence
of the network may need to be improved in order to increase
the level of control within the Internet; currently a loosely
controlled system of interconnected networks. In particular
it may be highly advantageous to push the blocking of traf-
fic out into the network, preventing the need for traffic to be
blocked at the last hop, prior to the corporate network. This
would need to be controlled on a per user or per network
basis, allowing for the current level of fine grained control
afforded to firewall and network administrators. Such a sys-
tem would allow for the blocking of SMTP traffic from par-
ticular hosts, for example those on the Spamhaus SBL, at
their upstream ISP, reducing the amount of traffic travers-
ing the Internet.
Another interesting approach would see the creation of
an SMTP IP address whitelist, providing the IP addresses
for SMTP servers that are known to be legitimate and well
administered. One possible source of this information is
the whitelists generated by the greylisting process, at the
very minimum it would provide a list of IP addresses known
to be running appropriately behaving SMTP servers. This
could be used in conjunction with blacklisting and greylist-
ing, preventing the need to delay delivery from all unknown
servers.
VoIP would appear to have a very large potential for
communication in the future, however it also has some of
the biggest issues as far as abuse is concerned. Identifying
ways to avoid the misuse and abuse of VoIP will be critical
if it is going to be widely and effectively used. Without such
mechanisms its usability will be severely impacted, possi-
bly in ways worse than that seen to date with email.
8. Conclusion
Digital communication systems have resulted in in-
creased communication around the globe and provide a
highly cost effective means of communicating with anyone,
anywhere. However, the same principles that have made it
highly effective and usable have also allowed for it to be
abused by spammers. Viruses have also taken their toll, us-
ing communication systems such as email to transmit them-
selves around the Internet.
Many of the existing technologies discussed in this pa-
per can be implemented successfully, as outlined in the
email scanning gateway used for a commercial deploy-
ment. It is worth noting that there does not appear to be
a single solution to digital pests, rather a multi-layered ap-
proach is required in order to achieve maximum effective-
ness. Spam appears to be an ongoing problem and numer-
ous approaches will probably be required in order to keep it
under control. Whilst we may not be able to eliminate spam
in its entirety, a significant reduction is far better than none,
increasing the usability of what are arguably the world’s
most important communication systems.
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